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Gregory Martin stant >side-shows< 4 . It seems logical that the Senegalese and North African troops, who made up for the shortage of French troops in Africa, should someday have been called on to make up for the lack of French troops in Europe. In actual fact though, a direct^nilitary contribution by native troops to a European war had hardly entered into the French General Staff's serious planning before the war at all 5 . This was despite the noisy propaganda of a small lobby in favour of such a contribution. French colonial administration was confused, while the Third Republic's instable coalition administrations and public opinion had a limited interest in foreign policy and colonial matters. French public opinion's relative indifference to overseas matters explains the limits of the success of the colonial lobby 6 .
Though the Algerians' martial qualities had led them to being seen as ideal military material by the French as early as 1845 and especially under the second empire, the formers' numbers only rose from about 7000 in 1850 to 13 725 in 1870 7 . Adolph Messimy, rapporteur de la budget de la guerre, repeated at the end of 1907 a suggestion first made in 1905: that as a remedy for France's demographic weakness vis-ä-vis Germany, partial conscription be introduced in Algeria, as it had already been in Tunisia. Worry about these troops' loyalty initially blocked this proposal. Before he became minister of war in 1908 Messimy again called for 100 000 troops to be raised in Algeria 8 . A small number of soldiers, politicians and administrators, united in part by their experiences in the Sudan at the turn of the century, likewise agitated in favour of the creation of a black army in France's West African colonies. The most famous and influential of this group, the soldier Charles Mangin, aroused much attention in 1910 with the publication of his book La force noire. Mangin suggested the black troops could maintain order in North Africa, releasing Messimy's North Africans for service in Europe. Prior to this step Mangin's internal propaganda in the war ministry in 1908 and 1909 had been poorly received. With articles and his book, he won the support of the press and of politicians like Gabriel Hanotaux. The principal French military journal, La France militaire, was an early convert to the force noire 9 . Public opinion was pleased by the immediate negative German reaction. During the second Moroccan crisis official-ly-inspired articles in the German press did attempt to exploit worries about Morocco as a source of military manpower for France; and the force noire was also later adduced to help justify a larger German army 10 . The idea of a black army had first been put forward towards the end of the nineteenth century, for use against Britain and to release French troops for Europe. Mangin and Messimy led those who aimed to exploit French West Africa's population of 10 millions and North Africa's 7 millions, to compensate for France's growing numerical inferiority vis-ä-vis Germany. In a confidential note of February 1908, proposing the creation of three divisions (28 000 men) ready for service in Europe by the end of 1910 Mangin »insistait sur la necessite de masquer le but principal, l'utilisation en Europe 11 .« During »l'epoque de la revanche« the common French thirst for revenge and expansion was particularly strong in the colonial army. A week before the outbreak of war in 1914, Mangin himself depicted the inspiration of his colonial career as having been to find the forces in the colonies with which France could recover his birthplace, Lorraine 12 .
The initially great popularity of the force noire with French public opinion can also be seen as a manifestation of the widespread tendency to value the empire principally as an augmentation of France's status as a great power 13 . Indeed, given the scepticism of the French General Staff towards the colonial enterprise, versus the priority of meeting the immediate German threat in Europe, the colonial lobby and army would have had no other option but to justify their activities in these terms. But this was also how the colonialists genuinely viewed the empire. Not only the colonial lobby as such, but a progressive leader like Caillaux and a large part of public opinion perceived Morocco as an essential power-political asset. Similarly, the trans-Saharan railway project was promoted as being capable of bringing the tropics' resources within six days of Paris. For most colonial administrators, soldiers and publicists, colonial expansion's vital selling point was its supposed utility in increasing France's raw materials and military manpower base, rather than official >cant< about assimilating the natives or France's civilizing mission. The important spiritual role of the empire was instead in redeeming France from the moral and spiritual decadence of modern civilization. Mangin's colonial shock troop theories were an exotic variant of the all-out offensive doctrine 14 . Tho In a letter to the French war ministry, 25.7.14, Mangin, pp. 144-145, cf. p. 90 (as in fn. 11); Histoire militaire de la France, vol. 3: de 1871 ä 1940, sous la direction de Guy Pedroncini, Paris 1992, pp. 1, 7; cf. pp. 2, 62. In Germany a distinction must be drawn between official military perceptions and those current in the press. The opinions circulated in the press tended to reflect and foster popular prejudices, which were contemptuous regarding foreign nations' military prowess. The assessments of Germany's probable enemies made by the General Staff in Berlin before the war were relatively more respectful and objective 20 . Before 1914 French native troops were unique, in representing the only substantial concern in military literature with the possible intervention of overseas troops in a European war. The stereotype image of France propagated in the German press before the war was of a country with a plunging birth-rate -a dying, effete and inferior country, though one still capable of hatching dangerous plots to encircle Germany in combination with Russia and Britain 21 . It should be noted that such views in part merely reflected a corresponding obsession in France itself with the perceived problem of decline and decadence, which persisted throughout the history of the Second Empire and Third Republic 22 . Such preconceptions in part account for the confident assumption underlying the Schlieffen plan, that France could easily be overrun. They also help explain the German General Staff's annually recurring expectation during the war of French manpower's imminent collapse. In prewar Germany France's readiness to resort to colonial troops was sometimes deprecated as a sign of its decadence, the necessity of doing so as a sign of its weakness.
The informed military press followed developments in France closely, including each stage of the force noire's beginnings. In its Vierteljahrshefte the German General Staff from the start publicly accepted that there were no insuperable obstacles to a realization of French plans. Instead, it soberly concluded the French government and parliament had once again shown that they were determined to do everything possible to uphold France's military strength -an example, it implied, for their German counterparts 23 . When the first Senegalese arrived in Mers-el-Kebir on 13 May 1910, the Militär-Wochenblatt commented »Der Versuch, in den Frankreich mit dieser Ueberführung Westafrikanischer Truppen nach seinen Nordafrikanischen Besitzungen getreten ist, bleibt beachtenswert.« It believed the Sengalese inability to survive the European climate precluded their use in France, but if they could adjust to North Africa, they might release the European and some North African troops there for use in the Vosges. »Die ganze Maßnahme bedeutet aber doch ein nur sehr fragwürdiges Auskommen, um einen Ausgleich für die immer schlechter werdenden Rekrutierungsverhältnisse der mutterländischen Armee abzugleichen 24 .« Nevertheless, the Militär-Wochenblatt's correspondent, Major a.D. Dietlein, believed that in case of mobilization the North African troops would provide France with a significant reserve of excellent troops 25 . But in his view the Franco-Prussian war had proved that the North Africans, let alone the Senegalese, were not hardy enough to survive exposure to the European climate. In addition, he was convinced that in a war the North African Arabs would rebel against the hated French and seek help from the reformed Turkey. France, far from being able to draw extra troops from Africa, would have to leave at least part of its garrison in North Africa to quell colonial rebellions 26 .
In 1911 French reports, monitored in Germany, spoke of the first Senegalese troops making a good military impression. It was even claimed that the black troops' health in the North African climate was superior to that of the Algerian soldiers. The Militär-Wochenblatt regarded these and other claims of success of the Senegalese experiment as wishful thinking; other observers had noticed a whole series of illnesses and failures among the Senegalese 27 . French preparations to make up for France's population decline by expanding its West and North African troops nonetheless went ahead. As far as the Arab troops were concerned, the Militär-Wochenblatt continued to rely on the danger they would revolt in the event of war. This, and the climatic factor, made it unclear whether the new troops would be used in Europe or Africa. Fears expressed elsewhere in Germany regarding France's colon- ial military potential were exaggerated 28 . The third major German criticism of the establishment of a <native< army was a matter of principle. »Ebenso wie die immer noch bestehende mittelalterliche Einrichtung der >Fremdenlegion< muß die Schaffung von aus halbwilden Negern bestehenden Truppen als einem Kulturstaate nicht würdig bezeichnet werden 29 .« This complaint was-to become ever more vocal, especially during the war.
In the following years the tone of the Militär-Wochenblatt's commentaries on French military measures remained condescending and superior. Whether it was a question of colonial troops or the reintroduction of three-year conscription, France merely seemed to be engaged in a series of desperate expedients to stave off its inevitable military and (general) decline. While certain French politicians issued renewed calls for increased use of West and North African troops against Germany, the Militär-Wochenblatt regularly pointed out the difficulties encountered and slow progress made, both in Morocco and with the Senegalese 30 . In 1913 the Militär-Wochenblatt's coverage reflected the eclipse of colonial military schemes in French conceptions by the reintroduction of three-year conscription. The dogma of a colonial revolution in the event of war lingered on in the assessment of France's colonial military resources. One of the Militär-Wochenblatt's French specialists, General von der Boeck, noted that the French proconsul in Morocco, General Lyautey, was calling for further French reinforcements. Algeria and Tunis's 70 000 garrison (half French) already provided forces for the pacification of Morocco. Algeria and Tunis could not be weakened further. Boeck concluded that in Germany »viel-fach übertriebene Vorstellungen« were prevalent, regarding the possibility of black troops in Europe. Even in a war it was doubtful whether France would be able to disentangle its XIX Corps from North Africa 31 . In France, he pointed out, the view had also prevailed that during a war it would probably be necessary to keep the XIX Corps in North Africa. Only after twenty years might it be possible to replace them with 50-60 000 Senegalese. Given similar French doubts about the timely intervention of the British Army, or the superiority of French munitions making up for Germany's numerical superiority, it was natural that the only counterbalance 39 .« In 1920 General von Kühl attempted to defend the General Staff against the accusations it had underestimated the resources of Germany's enemies. He was formally correct in claiming that before the war the Generalstab had explicitly recognized the possibility that France might attempt to meet its own declining military manpower, as well as an increase in the German army, by a heightened resort to France's colonial manpower. That France's colonial mobilization had assumed the magnitude it did, he pointed out, was not surprising, given the length of the war and the amount of prewar preparation. Though prewar assessments had been made available throughout the whole army and to the leading ministries through the General Staff's summaries and the Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereswesen, Kühl conceded that the information had not necessarily received the attention it had deserved. Superficial impressions, formed by officers and others on holiday (eg, regarding France's decadence) had possibly remained more influential. Those who had made the mistake of judging the French army by German standards had paid too much attention in particular to the French army's much-publicized disciplinary and health problems. Kuhl therefore concluded that predicting the shape of a future war correctly and the precise behaviour of an enemy was impossible; the attempt to judge a foreign army at any rate required an understanding of the parent society as a whole 40 .
As (20 000 in four years). Such results were, however, often secured by the use of arbitrary methods. At the beginning, the newly raised black troops were used to release the Senegalese battalions, which had been serving in Morocco and Algeria, for service in France. Ponty did succeed, however, in sending one allegedly more experienced regiment direct from West Africa to France.
Senegalese troops (about 10 000 in all) landed in Marseilles in September. Anthony Clayton suggests that so many of the troops raised in North Africa served in the French Army in France from the very first weeks of the war because of the »French belief that it would be imprudent to commit them in any large numbers against the Turks 45 .« But this ignores the fact that the relevant decisions were taken in August and September (even July). By the time Turkey entered the war, on 4 November, many of the first African units had already been bled white. The blacks arrived at the front towards the end of the battle of the Marne and were particu- Ponty-Doumergue (minister of colonies) 27.8.14, Michel, L'appel, pp. 43,65 (as in fn. 15). Gregory Martin, The influence of racial attitudes on British policy towards India during the First World War, pp. 92-3, in: IICH, vol. 14 (1986). The French pro-consul in Morocco, Lyautey, on the other hand, was more concerned with preserving France's precarious hold on the protectorate than despatching a Moroccan expeditionary force to France. Porch, Bugeaud, p. 404 (as in fn. 17). Instead of the 29 battalions envisaged by the prewar plan XVIII, 104 battalions were sent to France from North Africa. Meynier, pp. 260, 262-3 (as in fn. 13). 45 Clayton, France, soldiers and Africa, London 1988, p. 97.
larly prominent in the »course ä la mer« in October and November. Among the North Africans and Senegalese the experienced troops were quickly exhausted and replaced by hastily-trained young recruits, who in turn suffered extremely heavy losses from cold and fighting. Ponty's fresh West African regiment was the first to be returned to Morocco in November 1914 for further training. Some of the inexperienced North African replacements panicked or refused to obey, with the result that in at least one case Foch ordered a Tunisian company in 38th infantry division to be decimated as an example. The ten Senegalese battalions had virtually been wiped out by the end of November 1914. The survivors, enough to reform one battalion, were transported back to North Africa before the end of 1914. The Senegalese had been discredited in the eyes of the French high command (GQG). »[L]e discredit qui pesa sur elles n'etaient pas justifie; elles furent mal jugees, mal utilisees et meme mal commandees.« They had been repeatedly thrown into the frontline with very little preparation and were subsequently kept there too long (partly to avoid arousing resentment among the North African troops). The Germans' destruction of the ten Senegalese battalions in 1914 was taken by the force noire's opponents as proof of its low military value. According to Balesi, the legend that these troops had been destroyed because they had not fought well or been effective, was repeated during and after the war as late as the 1970s 46 .
The very rapid expansion of France's colonial military forces had not been prepared by the French General Staff before the war. But in 1914 it still did not exceed what the German General Staff had foreseen as theoretically possible. The immediate impact on the German high command's operational perceptions appears not to have been great. Most significant, however, was the gradual disappointment of prewar assumptions regarding the crippling effect of colonial rebellions on the war-efforts of the colonial powers. First impressions on the German side of the combat value of the French colonial troops were on the whole positive. Senegalese troops were well-trained, the Moroccans somewhat wilder. »Es sind zum Teil kräftige Menschen, jedenfalls stärker als die Franzosen 47 .« The appearance of relatively small numbers of colonial troops in Europe also attracted a disproportionate amount of attention in German (and for that matter Entente) propaganda. The war correspondent, Walter Oertel, after praising the British Indian forces in the Frankfurter Zeitung, wrote »Viel niedriger als die Inder stehen die meisten Hilfsvölker der Franzosen. Aber nicht etwa militärisch. Die Senegalneger z.B. sind ganz ausgezeichnete Schützen und haben sich auch sonst sehr tapfer geschlagen.« In support of this he cited a case near Bailleul where the Senegalese had fought to the death. To destroy the positions held by the West Africans the Germans had eventually been forced to bring up artillery, long after the rest of the French line 46 Michel, L'appel, pp. 291-3 (as in fn. 15). Histoire de la France coloniale, p. 102 (as in fn. 13). The XIX corps had been transferred immediately to France on the outbreak of war. It included five Senegalese battalions. On their first day of action, 21.8.14, 250 were killed. The 1st and 2nd Senegalese battalions arrived in Marseilles on 1.10.14. They held out without reinforcement in the Yser mud with French sailors against German attacks from 26.10.14-9.11.14. On 9-10.10.14 10 000 French troops, including the remnants of the 1st, 2nd & 4th Senegalese battalions resisted 40 000 German attackers. The Senegalese battalions subsequently had to be dissolved. Balesi, pp. 210, 234, 286, 305-7 (as in fn. 4). Meynier, pp. 274r-6 (as in fn. 13). 47 >Benützung der kriegsgefangenen Muhammedaner<. Denkschrift, Baron Oppenheim, 2.10.14. R21167, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA-AA).
had fled 48 . The orientalist Max Oppenheim, seconded to the Auswärtiges Amt, correctly suspected the Senegalese' courage in battle might have been inspired by French tales of German atrocities against prisoners. Marc Michel, the premier historian of the French West African war effort, reports a similar incident at Dixmude on 10 November, where a Senegalese unit, having previously been shown a photo of a Senegalese prisoner allegedly tortured by the Germans, refused to surrender and had to be destroyed by artillery fire at 50 m range 49 . While arousing temporary German admiration for the Senegalese, such episodes also lent themselves to exploitation in German propaganda, which accused the Entente of using their colonial troops as cannon-fodder.
Oertel, not yet suspecting GQG's dissatisfaction with them, attributed the withdrawal of the Senegalese from the front in 1914 to their vulnerability to the winter. As for the North African troops, he optimistically assumed the French reluctance to use them independently in large formations was due to Turkey's proclamation of a holy war. On the whole, as far as an objective or definitive military assessment of their combat-value was concerned though, colonial troops were too new ä factor and their numbers too low, to be properly judged, or to make a great impression. Oertel, unlike some hasty critics in the French and British high commands, at least recognized this. »Ueber die Kampftüchtigkeit dieser Regimenter liegen keine abschließenden Urteile vor 50 .«
The Militär-Wochenblatt published no serious discussion of the colonial troops' military effectiveness after August 1914. From the height of its prewar standards, it declined to being a propaganda adjunct of the German war effort. In autumn 1914 it was already reassuring its readers that France, its reserves gone, was having to call up fifteen and sixteen-year olds and men over fifty. Pressing colonial subjects into service would also not help: »das europäische Klima wird auf diese Leute ebenso verwüstend wirken wie auf die Indier »Nous n'avons trouve aueune preuve du fait. On peut aussi penser ä une photographie truqee destinee ä durcir le moral des hommes.« Michel, L'appel, pp. 291 & 307, fn. 30 (as in fn. 15). Later in the war atrocity propaganda, overused by both sides, proved a doubleedged weapon: in Algeria, eg, it contributed in one case at least, to depressing recruiting, Meynier, p. 283 (as in fn. 4). German harping on the colonial troops' savagery only augmented the latter's reputation among German troops, which in case of demoralization could be dangerous: »Nach einer schriftlichen Meldung des Batls. Kdeurs., [ und Frankreichs in ihren Grundfesten erschüttert sind 52 .« Before the war a great deal of attention had always been paid to the pacification of the French colonies and their security problems. While censorship during the war made such information even more difficult to come by, it was even more eagerly sought after. News of heavy fighting in Morocco was publicized as confirming prewar expectations that the colonies would prove military liabilities, rather than assets in war 53 .
During 1915 the French kept their North African units in France, while the Senegalese (except for 5000 who served at the Dardanelles) were sent to North Africa. Over 70 000 Senegalese (including porters for the campaigns in Africa) had been mobilized by October 1915. During 1915 there were a further 12 000 enlistments in Algeria, bringing the number of war volunteers to 27 000 by the beginning of 1916 54 .
In his review of the military situation on 5 January 1915, General von Blume pointed out that despite France's >Völkergemisch< mobilization and the Entente's general superiority in numbers and resources, they had been completely unsuccessful on the Western Front (though Germany had to defend the Eastern Front too). The potential reinforcement of the French Army by 200 000 Mahommedans, used as >Kanonenfutter<, was noted later in the year without any great excitement 55 . The annual German prediction, made in June 1915, that France would run out of men by late autumn, had to be revised almost immediately, to allow for the maintenance of the French Army until May 1916 (This forecast in turn subsequently had to be discarded) 56 .
Regarding France's North African troops, particular attention was given to information with a bearing on lingering German hopes of encouraging disorder and rebellion in France and Britain's Mahommedan territories. The Austrian ambassador in Rome reported in January 1915 that French morale was bad, because of the failure of expensive attacks against Germany. This was supposed to be particularly so among Mahommedan troops, who had therefore had to be distributed between British units. In July Falkenhayn called his army's commanders' attention to reports that the French were applying strict disciplinary measures against Mahommedans, to prevent them deserting to the German lines 57 61 . But Mangin, pointing to the British empire's mobilization, claimed the French colonies could supply 500 000 men, 300 000 from West Africa alone. These Would be shock troops and would preserve France's military autonomy vis-ä-vis Britain. The colonial administration opposed such projects. The French General Staff doubted the military value of Indo-Chinese troops and that Africa could yield so many men. But Mangin's claims, as ever, aroused great enthusiasm in the popular press, unfamiliar with colonial realities. The government referred both to military needs and public opinion in its decree of 9 October 1915, which somewhat naively instructed the colonial governors to embark on a new programme of »voluntary« enlistment. Contrary to Clozel's misgivings, the Mahommedan and other elites in West Africa for the most part cooperated with the French authorities in aiding recruitment and opposing resistance. By June 1916 52-53 000 men had been recrui- In the German military press the French extension of conscription and the exploitation of the colonies to meet the German Army, was attributed to the danger of France bleeding to death. In addition to raw materials, France was believed to have obtained 400 000 soldiers and 80 000 workers from its colonies 65 . The German General Staff seems to have been alerted rather late by an agent, that the Senegalese were once more being moved back to France in strength. In September 1916 it believed 40 battalions to be in France (23 at the front), plus reinforcements of between five to forty men for each company in white regiments. It put the total number of Senegalese in France quite accurately at about 60 000
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. By the end of 1916 the General Staff was aware that substantial new recruitment in the French colonies was to be expected. Including men still in the colonies, plus the Madagascans and Indochinese (who in France were only used in garrisons and on the lines of communication), total colonial recruitment was estimated to be 430 000 67 . German staff officers were also accurately informed on current French assessments of the Senegalese combat-effectiveness. According to French prisoners' statements, the Senegalese were little suited for attack, at least not as the first wave of storm-troops. 62 Michel, L'appel, pp. 74, 78 (as in fn. 15). Cf. Balesi, p. 234 (as in in. 4). 63 A fourth edition of a brief summary on the French Army, published in February 1917, drew on the experiences of 1916. The North African troops, whose numbers were put at thirty-three battalions, were considered to have proved themselves thoroughly as combat-troops. They were inured to the French climate and in winter remained at the front. They were deployed partially in purely Arab units ^ti-railleurs indigenes, marocains, tunesiens, algeriens<) and partly in >regiments mixtes<. Fifty-six Senegalese battalions had been identified in France, but it was assumed there were probably more available (as many as 86 in total -this assumption was almost exactly accurate). Only two purely Senegalese regiments had been established definitely at the front. It was known that their employment in closed Senegalese units was considered on the French side not to have been a success, in view of the moral effect of artillery fire. The majority were used only as labourers (incorrect) and all were sent south in winter. Men from the West Indies were likewise distributed among white units as non-combatants, Somalis and Madagascans had so far not been identified. The Indochinese were also used as labourers 70 .
In which at the time were blamed on recruiting. Even where no rebellions had occurred, the colonial authorities were perturbed by the general upheavals occasioned by recruiting. For the time being the new West African governor general, Van Vollenhoven, was able to insist (after the replacement of Andre Maginot as colonial minister by Rene Besnard), that the choice in West Africa was between a military effort (and more rebellions), and the more promising alternative of an economic mobilization. Van Vollenhoven secured Paris' agreement to concentrate on the latter. A total of 84 Senegalese battalions were available to the French high-command in 1917, but many of these remained in depots, and on the lines of communication 72 . According to Kanya-Foster and Andrew, as far as the North Africans' combateffectiveness was concerned, the views of the French coincided with the saying »The Algerian is a man, the Tunisian is a woman, the Moroccan is a warrior 73 .« The Moroccans lived up to their reputation, the most decorated unit in the entire French Army being a Moroccan regiment, but because of Morocco's incomplete pacification recruiting remained limited. Despite their great bravery, the high-command remained convinced the Senegalese were of very limited value without white cadres. The major fault, however, lay in the inadequate training given to the Senegalese. Their white officers had little understanding of, or confidence in their men and »appear[ed] to believe that the only way a Black can be made to march is to be driven from behind 74 .<«
One of the Militär-Wochenblatt's rare discussions of the native troops' performance coincided with the ill-fated Chemin des Dames offensive. The French belief in the North African troops' apparently excellent combat-effectiveness, adaptability and discipline, which had led to their repeated use in the heaviest fighting, was reported as a French claim -German corroboration or refutation of such claims was not offered. Notice was also taken of general French complaints about the Senegaleses' health, in particular in regard to lung diseases, echoing prewar climatic predictions. The West Indies, Madagascar, Indochina and the Four Communes in Senegal had provided small numbers. The Militär-Wochenblatt combatted the positive aspects of the enemy military achievement propagandistically: All the colonial troops were said to regard the war with France against Germany as a common, holy cause.
»Wir 75 .« In official French propaganda, colonial subjects were actually for the first time formally grouped with the civilized world, for the purposes of combatting the TurkoGerman barbarians. During the war open racism in the press was suppressed; France presented itself as the champion of Islam 76 .
The OHL reacted too late to the mutinies and partial collapse in discipline and morale which befell the French Army after the failure of the Nivelle offensive. Even in July Ludendorff still dismissed reports of the French mutinies as »stark über-trieben« 77 . This was despite prisoner statements revealing the very deep depression occasioned by the defeat. German intelligence believed only the prospect of American help continued to prop up the French government, but no-one in Paris expected American aid to become effective before autumn 1918. Nevertheless, it was at this time that the armies on the Western Front received instructions from Ludendorff, aimed at making more systematic use of the experience gathered by individuals and units, as well as prisoner-information, in order to build up a better picture of the enemy's capabilities for current and future operations. Reports had to include an assessment of the quality of enemy officers and men; comments on their discipline and cohesion (»inneren Halt«); the level of training of all arms; combat-effectiveness; and an assessment of the quality of weapons and equipment.
»Wertvoll ist dabei auch die Feststellung, inwiefern die Anschauungen, die man in der deutschen Armee im Frieden über das französische Heer hatte, sich auf Grund der Kriegserfahrungen geändert habet;; ferner in welchem Grade und in welcher Weise bei Organisation und Ausbildung des englischen Heeres französischer Einfluss mitbestimmend gewesen ist 78 .« Army commands and divisions were given until 15 August to select suitable experts from front-line units and staffs to report separately on the British and French armies. A pamphlet was supplied with thirty-three questions to be asked of French prisoners, such as differences in the military value of troops, the roles and relationships between officers and men, on munitions, etc. Question twenty-three ran »Wie haben sich die nordafrikanischen 
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The last question sought information on French judgements of the German Army. >Fra-A list of the French Army's divisions, with an assessment of each, issued by the Abteilung Fremde Heere (AFH -Foreign Armies Department) of the General Staff on 5 September, may be considered among the first fruits of the new system of intelligence-gathering. The foreword stressed that the combat-effectiveness of enemy troops required constant review. The troops' own experiences had to complement the results of prisoner-interrogations and they were expected to deliver their own judgement of the enemy's combat-effectiveness independently 80 . The list was only for the personal orientation of the army command and their intelligence officers. Of the French Army's 116 divisions, 43 were defined as »Angriffsdivisionen«, 46 as »Durchschnittsdivisionen« and 27 as »Stellungsdivisionen«, only suitable for employment on quiet stretches of the front. The French Army's poor morale at the beginning of the year appeared to have improved, thanks to the Entente successes in Flanders and at Verdun. Together with the hopes founded on America's decisive intervention, this had helped to reconcile the army to another war-winter. As a whole »[hat die französische Armee] noch als erstklassige[r] Gegner zu gelten«. It is nevertheless interesting to note that while in the AFH's view roughly two-thirds of the French metropolitan army belonged to the lower categories, according to their military value, almost all the. Colonial divisions, composed of French units belonging to the organizationally separate Colonial Army and native troops, were defined as »Ausgesprochene Angriffsdivisionen« (the very highest category). The remaining Colonial divisions still ranked as »Angriffsdivisionen«. All the coloured divisions and the Moroccan division, without exception, were rated at the top, as »Ausgesprochene Angriffsdivisionen«. The other >assault-divisions< included the active divisions of I, II, VII, XII, XX and XXI frontier corps and those whose regiments came from the north and centre of France. (Even before the war troops from the south -or Midi -had traditionally possessed a poor military reputation in France, while the Colonial Army was more highly regarded.) The AFH noted that the assault divisions were employed repeatedly in almost every operation 81 .
An example of the sources for such assessments on the part of the German General Staff can be found in the protocol of the interrogation of a Moroccan prisoner, whom the interrogating officer described as »mit Recht stolz [ Die Verluste sind entsprechend; der Ersatz stammt hauptsächlich aus Marokko und Algerien. Gesundheitszustand der Truppe gut; die Mannschaften gelten als besonders zähe 82 .« By the end of the year reports were speaking of a general weakening of the combat-effectiveness of the French Army (a phenomenon, of course, which was affecting all the combatants by this stage, including the German Army). The 10th Colonial division, previously regarded as a particularly good assault-unit was described as »abgekämpft« in December. The 15th Colonial division, while still good, was no longer an outstanding assault-division, unlike the Moroccan 83 . But other reports spoke of the »Division marocain« itself being war-weary and of antagonism between the men and their French superiors leading to the shooting of specially-hated officers and NCOs (non-commissioned Officers) by Moroccan soldiers during attacks 84 .
Reports composed at divisional and corps level (and therefore presumably closer to front-line realities) assessed the combat-effectiveness of the Senegalese somewhat higher than the global evaluations produced higher up the military hierarchy. Evaluations of the French 10th and 15th Colonial divisions, for example, attributed their deterioration as being partly due to the fact that »Von Anfang Oktober an sind die Senegalesen, die bei Angriffen die Hauptlast des Kampfes tragen, des Klimas wegen nicht mehr zu verwenden 85 .« According to the AFH, on the other hand, French morale, though still war-weary and resigned, was better than in the spring and France remained »ein durchaus beachtenswerter Gegner«. But an increase in coloured troops, hoped for a year previously, had failed, and the French had had to content themselves with maintaining their »brown regiments« at their current strength. »Die schwarzen Truppen (Senegalneger) bewährten sich trotz gründlicher Ausbildung wiederum nicht. Sie sind ebenso wie die in Assam und Tonkin ausgehobenen Verbände, im allgemeinen nur als Arbeitstruppen zu verwenden und zu bewerten 86 .« Based on the experiences of 1917, this assessment was largely accurate, though it is possible both the French and German high-commands underestimated the Senegalese' combat-effectiveness. Since their heavy losses in the Nivelle offensive, the Senegalese had only been employed in isolated operations. The French high- command, under Petain, did not put its faith in their large-scale employment as storm-troops. Under Van Vollenhoven attempts at large-scale recruitment had also leased. But a month before the AFH brought out its report, French policy in the area of coloured recruitment and the employment of such troops at the front changed radically, with Clemenceau's appointment as premier.
Clemenceau replaced Painleve on 16 November 1917. His top priority was to obtain victory on the Western Front at all costs. His strategy, like that of Petain, was to remain on the defensive, and avoid casualties, until the Americans were able to intervene in strength. In 1917-18 while very worried by the prospect of a German offensive and predictions that the French Army might be short of 200 000 men in 1918, Petain relied on the class of 1919 and reconvalescents, rather than on the discredited force noire. Petain also developed tactics embodying the maximum use of materiel to economize on French lives, while waiting for the Americans. Colonial troops and labour were of limited importance in his calculations 87 . Since he realized the Americans' help might not become significant before late 1918, or even 1919, Clemenceau, however, hoped in the meantime to meet the French Army's manpower crisis by all means available. In this context, Africa was a convenient source of cannon-fodder 88 . He squeezed Van Vollenhoven out of office by overruling the political and military experts on colonial matters in France and the colonies, none of whom carried much weight in public affairs. Since he had little or no interest in the colonies except as a source of immediate military strength, it was a matter of indifference to him if massive recruitment and promises of political reforms caused colonial upheavals 89 .
Clemenceau listened to the deputies Flandin and Jonnart, the advocates of a more liberal Algerian policy and to the disgraced Mangin, whom he brought back to a senior command. Mangin, while warning Clemenceau against the colonial governors and colons' opposition, typically predicted the empire could still supply another 362 000 troops and 252 000 labourers, including 100 000 Senegalese in the line by spring 1919. In Algeria, which had already supplied 120 000 men by the end of 1917, the colons did indeed resent the political and social disturbances cau- sed by recruiting, as well as the increased labour costs. But Flandin and Jonnart pointed out that if the empire's 50 million souls were added to France's 40 million, this would create a bloc which could match a German-dominated Mitteleuropa 90 . Clemenceau was also interested in recovering the French troops detained in North Africa and replacing them with Senegalese. (This matched the British efforts in 1918 to replace white troops in the Turkish theatres with Indians, while returning the former to the Western Front 91 .)
The authorities in West Africa were told at the end of 1918 that they had to provide 47 000 new troops. Algeria was given a similar target. East Africa was to 'provide 13 000 92 . Clemenceau appointed Blaise Diagne, the black deputy for Senegal and first African to sit in the French parliament, as >Commissaire de la Republique< with the powers of a governor general, to explain and advocate the new recruitment in Africa. The material rewards offered to recruits were increased and a more progressive policy towards the colonies promised. Diagne remained in Africa from 18 February to 16 August 1918. With what armed opposition there had been to recruiting in 1916 and 1917 crushed or disarmed, the 1918 recruitment drive was the best prepared and most successful of the war, with the indigenous elites being effectively appealed to and impressed by the new approach. Black Africa provided 77 000 new recruits, with West Africa widely exceeding its target (63 000 came from West Africa, 14 000 from East Africa). At the end of April 56 000 were ready to embark, but it was not until the end of October that 50 000 had reached Morocco, Algeria and France 93 . The Senegalese who served in France in 1918 were largely veterans recruited earlier.
Despite all these upheavals the Militär-Wochenblatt practically ignored the role of the French colonial troops during 1918. It did claim Foch had been forced to attack in the summer, because later he would have been unable to rely on the Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, Senegalese, Indians, Australians and Americans. These troops, being from warmer climates, were said to suffer from poor health in the winter 94 95 .« Given its 1918 reporting, the Militär-Wochenblatt's postwar claim that the colonial troops had won the war for France is thus even less credible. It rather confirms the consistent propaganda use to which reporting of the French colonial troops was put, to the detriment of any balanced coverage of their military capabilities. The reversal in assessment was, however, only superficial. As in the case of the Militär-Wochenblatt's even more precipitous military reappraisal of the AEF 96 , the continuity of purpose with the war remained putting the German Army's performance in the best light. During the war this had been achieved by means of denying or ignoring the importance of the French colonial (and American) military achievements, as well as belittling these forces' professional competence. In 1919 the line taken was that the German Army would have prevailed against the French Army alone, had it not been for the dangerous hordes of overseas troops (and the homefront's >Dolchstoß<).
On the German side, the AFH in 1918 was, as in previous years, surprised by the French achievement in maintaining army strength. It believed most of the reinforcements were reconvalescents, men who had been recalled after being discharged or the 1918 class of recruits. But it also noticed that the French had begun to use quite large numbers of Senegalese to fill up their white regiments and it was believed 20-30 000 men had been released from the munitions industry by the employment of foreigners, coloured workers and women. As for morale, the AFH reported that after the deep depression caused by the German victories of the spring, the French Es hat den Krieg, namentlich im Sommer 1918, in großem Umfange mit Farbigen geführt. Das hätten wir naturlich nie tun, wohl aber größeren Vorteil aus unseren Kolonien gewinnen können.« Actually, Ludendorff had been in favour of Germany reversing its prewar error in not raising a large colonial army, in view of the war's developments. »Während für den Feind die Kolonien eine militärische Kraftquelle waren, haben unsere Kolonien uns nicht entlastet, keinesfalls in dem Maße, wie wir rückblickend es hätten verlangen müssen. Die Kolonien haben militärisch ein Sonderdasein geführt, in kritischen Lagen wie beim Feldzug in Südwest, müßte der Chef des Generalstabes eintreten und die Operation leiten. Wir müssen in der Zukunft die Kolonien in den Rahmen unserer Landesverteidigung und Kriegführung einbeziehen, und darum muß ich fordern, daß in Zukunft auch unsere Kolonien militärisch voll ausgenutzt werden. Der Gedanke an eine Neutralität der Kolonien ist so utopisch, daß ich glaube, ihn nach den Erfahrungen dieses Krieges endgültig als beseitigt ansehen zu können. Es wird daher nötig sein, sobald die Kolonialbesitz-Frage geregelt ist, Maßnahmen zu treffen, die die Aufstellung einer Kolonial-Armee in Afrika zum Ziel haben.« Ludendorff -Kühlmann, 23.12.17, Lother Rathmann, Die imperialistische Nahostpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, Wahrheiten über den deutschen Imperialismus, Bd 9, Berlin 1962, p. 71. Army's mood had improved rapidly once the front had stabilized 97 . By the last months of the war French morale was considered extraordinarily high, since with American help and in view of the recent victories, the French now hoped for victory in 1918. Many French officers were described as being particularly aggressive, unlike most of their men. The latter were disappointed that fighting had continued, despite Germany's offer of an armistice. They were indifferent about AlsaceLorraine, but determined before going home to drive the Germans out of France. An active propaganda was being waged to persuade the men that a final effort was necessary. The majority of soldiers were prepared to make this effort and if necessary, accept another war winter 98 .
In the last survey of the French Army produced before the March offensive, the AFH reiterated the view that the North African Arabs were »das militärisch wertvollste Menschenmaterial aller französischen Kolonien [...] Die Nerven der Truppe sind den Eindrücken der modernen Schlacht voll gewachsen.« They could also bear the winter. It was believed there were at least 41 such battalions in France. The numbers of West Indian, Somali, Madagascan or Indochinese combat troops in France were correctly supposed to be insignificant. The bulk of French colonial troops remained the Senegalese, whose numbers were estimated, again correctly, at about 120 battalions available in France and abroad. The significance of the newly-decided French policy regarding colonial military recruitment, however, was misread. Its motives were believed to be mainly economic, a. not unreasonable assumption, based on 1917.
»Die an eine große farbige Armee geknüpften Hoffnungen haben sich nicht erfüllt. Nur ein verhältnismäßig kleiner Teil, den die Nordafrikaner stellen, entspricht den Anforderungen des modernen Kampfes. Der Zuwachs an Arbeitskräften durch Einstellung von Farbigen aller Kolonien bleibt aber bedeutend. Die für Afrika kürzlich beschlossenen Neuaushebungen sollen anscheinend diese Arbeitskräfte verstärken 99 .« The prospects for the coming offensive seemed to be good, since in terms of morale 1917 had shown that »der französische Soldat (auch der Araber im Gegensatz zum Neger) hatte zwar gut angegriffen«, but heavy reverses had led to a collapse in morale, mutinies and subsequently to Petain's cautious military approach. The French colonial divisions played a leading role in 1918's continuous heavy fighting. As in 1917, those closer to the front assessed the performance of the Senegalese higher than the staffs to the rear. But, as in the German Army, almost all French units had suffered further heavy losses and were frequently war-weary by the second half of the year. Prisoners captured in September from the elite, mixed, mainly coloured 38th division, although still classed by the German General Staff as belonging to an »Ausgesprochene Angriffsdivision«, themselves felt their division needed recuperation and believed that no distinction was any longer made on the French side between assault divisions and »Stellungsdivisionen« 100 . Among the prisoners were »5 eingeborene Comores-Neger«. The two NCOs were described as making an intelligent and good military impression. They themselves described their relationship with their French comrades as extremely bad, on account of a strict and unjust regime. They also complained their white superiors were liars and that it was exclusively the coloured troops who were most exposed to danger (Michel points out that while brutality towards the black troops in the French Army certainly existed, it was exceptional and was not officially tolerated) 101 . Clayton believes a certain camaraderie developed between the Algerian troops and their French comrades. As Gilbert Meynier points out, the North Africans fought well because mistreatment was not serious. The colonial soldiers were never treated or regarded as the equals of their French comrades. But mistreatment and humiliations, though not rare, were not the rule. The black troops suffered more than the North Africans, but the situation at the end of the war was better than at the start. With regard to the granting of leave the African troops were all disadvantaged. French, cadres, interpreters, and the French personnel in the various camps were entrusted with monitoring the physical and moral condition of the colonial troops. In 1917 the North Africans, who were supposed to resemble the French more than the Senegalese, were consequently considered to be more prone to infection by the French army's >bad morales Native officers, who could not rise higher than lieutenant, or give orders to white officers of the same rank, were subjected to particular supervision 102 .
Another outstanding coloured assault-division, the 67th, was described as being worn out by fighting at about this time. But in the case of the Moroccan division intelligence officers still reported »Die Zusammensetzung der Division beweist, daß sie unbedingt den Ausgesprochenen Angriffsdivisionen zuzuzählen ist. Trotz der erheblichen Verluste, ist sie immer noch angriffsfähig 103 .« The significance of such information and its tactical use is illustrated by the report at the beginning of October from the 18th Army, that the likelihood of a surprise attack had increased, since coloured troops had appeared opposite their front. Prisoner reports that the normal transfer of the Senegalese at the beginning of the winter had been postponed at the end of October, in view of planned attacks, were also carefully noted 104 .
III. »Kanonenfutter«
German propaganda claimed both the British and French used their colonial troops as cannon-fodder (»Kanonenfutter«) 105 . The attitudes which emerge from this line of propaganda are a curious mixture. Assumed moral outrage on behalf of the massacred natives attempted to revive the atmosphere of the prewar Congo scandals. But this was counterbalanced by unalloyed contempt for the >farbiges Gesindel·, and tacit fear of their innate savagery. Marc Michel acknowledges that the >Ku-gelfang< accusation gained a wider currency as a result of the events of April 1917. (Actually, this accusation had been levelled on the German side since 1914.) But he denies that the GQG deliberately used the Senegalese as cannon-fodder, as do Clayton and Balesi 106 . The terms used by German propaganda to attack French tactical doctrine governing the use of colonial troops ->Kugelfang< and >Kanonen-futter< -were naturally polemical. But it would be disingenuous, just because propaganda attacks can be dismissed as such, to imply that French tactical deployment of colonial troops was innocent. The colonial troops' deployment as storm troops, which occasionally cost them heavy losses, can be explained by reference to prewar French military ideas regarding the use of colonial troops.
Assessing the worth of the colonial troops in the hierarchy of French military resources also involves recalling the origins of the colonial forces. As already mentioned, the colonies as a destination for French troops rated low on the list of French military priorities. The relative lack of conscripts and the reluctance to detach them from the Vosges to the colonies (or navy), made it logical and necessary to recruit cheap forces on the spot. This also explains the use of the Foreign Legion in colonial conflicts. The Foreign Legion was deployed wherever losses were particularly likely. The legionnaries were eminently expendable, having no political constituency and receiving no pension 107 -somewhat like the comparatively cheap colonial natives and penal battalions. The deployment of the colonial troops also has to be seen against the background of how they were recruited. The 1880s saw an increased resort to Senegalese recruiting through cooperation with local chiefs. It was in fact reminiscent of the >slave-military< recruiting, combatted by Britain earlier in the nineteenth century 108 . This practice increased the authority of the chiefs, who often coerced their subjects into military service. The voluntary principle remained relative in prewar recruiting for Mangin's force noire and in execution of the >plan Ponty<. According to Andrew and Kanya-Foster »Many >volunteers< for the war effort in both African and Indochina were, in reality, victims of the press gang.« The Histoire de la France coloniale agrees recruiting in practice was often by force, with some exceptions 109 . The fact that chiefs received a bonus for recruits delivered inevitably resulted in compulsion. Forced recruiting in turn led to desertion, individual and collective evasion, active and passive resistance and even contributed to or sparked off, revolt. In parts of West Africa it led to a mass exodus to the sanctuary of the British colonies (and worsened Franco-British relations in the colonies). Resistance to wartime forced recruiting was admittedly often a continuation of prewar developments. It varied regionally, depending on the length of French occupation, integration into the capitalist market and colonial system. Conscription was often the last straw which provoked resistance in traditional animist or Mahommedan societies, especially those recently subdued. It can be seen as a revolt against the entire economic, social and political (not just military) impact of French colonial rule 110 .
German >Kugelfang< propaganda was a very effective way of disposing propagandistically, first, with the strength of the Entente's colonial mobilization, and secondly, with any military virtues displayed by the colonial troops. If colonial troops attacked well, this could be dismissed, either because they did so at gunpoint (which showed their colonial masters to be cowards and immoral), or because they were merely following their animal instincts. In the latter case the French and British of course deserved condemnation for their betrayal of the white race in using such troops against a civilized opponent in Europe. The Entente was also responsible for the atrocities colonial troops were accused of. Skilfully used, therefore, reports of the Entente's colonial troops did not need to give the impression of inexhaustible manpower resources (as the Entente liked to), but instead provided an excellent device for stoking up hatred of the enemy:
»Die The French high command did not question the dogma that African troops could not withstand an European winter. Instead, they solved the problem by withdrawing the Senegalese troops to winter quarters in the south of France during the cold weather (even the >Originaires< were pulled out of French units, despite the disruption involved). During their >hivernage< the Senegalese were only used to perform labour exceptionally, lest it blunt their >shock< qualities. These two stereotypes governed the deployment of the Senegalese and contributed directly to their fate in October-November 1914. The French war minister recommended in September 1914 that Joffre exploit the coloured troops' ethnically-determined offensive qualities as much as possible before the outset of winter. Joffre agreed 123 . The view in 1918 remained that held before the war: colonial troops were poor at manoeuvering and best used as shock-troops, provided their regiments possessed good white cadres and these units were employed in combination with white units 124 .
The fundamental flaw in this doctrine was that in trench warfare, just as much as in other kinds of combat, the attack, if it were to be successful, was actually the most complicated manoeuvre, requiring the best-trained troops to execute it successfully. Thus it was only the best-trained infantry in the war, the German, which was able to carry out tactically-successful infantry offensives in March-June 1918, after months of special training. Equally, it was the untrained AEF militia, employing a similarly simplistic >shock doctrine* to the French colonial troops (Pershing's rifle and bayonet dogma), which suffered proportionally the highest casualties for their length of service in the front on the Entente side in 1918 125 . Among the Entente armies the most successful assault-infantry, such as the well-knit Canadian and Australian corps, gradually developed their skills as a result of separate training and staff procedures, which distinguished them from the mass of the British Army. In the French Army the >allez, allez< offensive style, which had failed so disastrously in [1914] [1915] , to an extent lived on in the >shock< role intermittently foisted on the colonial troops, as a specific result of French racial stereotyping. 126 . Among the Algerians, brigades were usually > stiffened < with at least one French unit »to ensure steadiness in the appalling trench-warf are conditions, [...] in attacks the waves of infantry would be deliberately drawn from both.« It was this undeniable »stiffening« of black troops with white, which German propaganda attempted to exploit (see note 113) 127 .
In Germany the counterpart to the French notion, in essence racist, that the colonial troops possessed an innate, animal savagery, which made them ideal stormtroops 128 was the atrocity/savage line of argument. To stiffen German prewar opposition the German publicist Max Harden had echoed exaggerated contemporary French hopes, by arguing that 200 000 colonial troops were equal to 500 000 Europeans (an early example of German propaganda's counterproductive tendency) 129 . Such claims help account for the force noire's popularity in the France of 1910-12; the revival of such hopes contributed to their first rapturous reception in 1914. The Senegalese were greeted as headcutters, who could drive back the German Army alone. Following the destruction of the ten Senegalese battalions in 1914, opinion temporarily swung almost to the opposite extreme. It was decided to amalgamate the Senegalese by assigning white companies to black battalions. It would have been easier to distribute the Senegalese as individuals among the French Army, as had already been done with the Senegalese French citizens (the >Originaires<). But this was avoided, despite the problem of finding white cadres for Senegalese units, because of Mangin's pet project of creating a large number of shock troops 130 .
There had from the beginning been rumours (originating with laudatory press articles in 1914), that the Senegalese were always used in the most dangerous spots. After the breakdown of inexperienced Senegalese troops deployed at Verdun (under Mangin) and on the Somme in 1916, the French command was forced to juxtapose every Senegalese battalion with two French ones 131 . Nevertheless, during the Nivelle offensive Mangin made an attempt to realize his force noire dream by deploying the Senegalese en masse. In a minute on a letter from the French commander-in-chief Nivelle to Lyautey (who had moved from Morocco briefly to become minister of war) in February 1917 the consideration of using colonial troops to save French lives emerged quite openly. Colonial troops should be used »(tant) pour donner de la puissance ä notre effectif (que pour d'epargner dans la mesure du possible du sang frangais) 132 .« A few months later in the Nivelle offensive, the Senegalese suffered 7415 casualties: 45 percent of the effectives engaged. The black troops' heavy losses led to their being temporarily withdrawn from the frontline. There continued to be voices, however, such as the commandant of the military training camp at Frejus, supported by the colonial politician Eugene Etienne, who urged that the Senegalese were »une chair ä canon ä utiliser pour epargner les Blancs, d'une fagon plus intense et non par petits paquets 133 .« As to whether the Senegalese losses could have been avoided, Michel notes Mangin must have known that the Senegalese were apparently >paralysed< by the cold; many who had been at the front for a month had already had to be evacuated. Even on Mangin's own figures the Senegalese suffered one-third of the Sixth Army's casualties, although forming only 14 percent of its effectives. (Half the Senegalese committed to battle on the Chemin des Dames were Bambara -regarded as >une race guerriere< par excellence by Mangin and other colonial experts 134 .) Mangin was in fact attacked by Diagne, the black deputy for Senegal, during a secret session of the French Chamber for massacring the Senegalese during the Nivelle offensive 135 . The failure when employing coloured troops to absorb the tactical lessons learnt in general since August 1914, reflected Mangin's racist assumptions regarding the inherent savagery of non-whites in general 136 . In Marc Michel's view they were not deliberately sacrificed, »Mais obsede par la theorie de leur >puissance de choc<, [le commandement] les avait langees sans tenir compte justement des conditions, la etait sa responsabilite 137 .« Though this led to the abandonment of the mass deployment of the Senegalese, Michel denies this was the rejection of a >Mangin doctrine<, since the latter allowed his subordinates to choose the black troops' exact tactical deployment 138 .
But Michel's dismissal of the >chair ä canon< charge is somewhat disingenuous, since this was not the final end of the idea of the Senegalese as assault troops, based on the view of their >primitive< racial attributes (or >puissance de choc<). This innate military orientation remained after all the raison d'etre of Mangin's continuing wartime and postwar campaign for the force noire. While Douglas Porch questions colonial officers' role in producing the fatal frontal attacks of 1870-71 and 1914, he does admit the moral influence of the colonial soldiers' offensive-mindedness affected the spirit, if not the techniques of French strategy and tactics in World War I 139 chel has argued, in an article published in 1987, that the casualties of the Senegalese effectives were no heavier than the average for the metropolitan French infantry in World War I (something over 20 percent). Moreover, only a part of the Senegalese losses were suffered in combat -the rest were due to cold, sickness, displacement. To this it might be objected that the same is true of the other French troops as well. In Michel's definitive magnum opus, L'appel ä l'Afrique, he himself noted 140 000 Senegalese went to Europe and at least 31000 definitely died there. Since the 1918 recruits hardly saw any fighting though, the fatalities of the approximately 100 000 who had served in France by the beginning of 1918 were approximately 30 percent 145 . In addition, one should not ignore the fact that while the colonial troops suffered the same overall proportion of losses as the French army, the Senegalese were in the front-line for a shorter period of time. The Senegalese' absence from the line during winter ought to have significantly reduced their casualties, not only from combat, but from weather and illness too 146 . The fact that they did not serve in France in 1915, and in 1917 were largely sheltered from further major combat after the Nivelle offensive, ought to have had a similar effect. Instead, apart from sustaining at least the same overall percentage of fatalities as the French infantry in a substantially shorter time, according to the Histoire de la France coloniale (Meynier), the North and West African troops suffered a different death: »consideres comme troupes de choc, peu comme troupes de secteur, les tirailleurs furent tues en premiere Hgne, dans des assauts, et moins dans les tranchees 147 .« German >Kugelfang< charges can be explained in view of the undeniable and well-documented French practice of using the colonial units, mixed with metropolitan, as shock troops. According to Michel, the Senegalese were never used alone or in front of other troops, as he thinks German propagandists claimed, but under the same conditions as their white comrades and closely intermingled with them. He even denies there was a doctrine governing the Senegalese' deployment. But what German >Kugelfang< charges sought to exploit was precisely this intermingling of French and colonial troops, indeed the cannonfodder argument was quite compatible with the admission that the Senegalese did not storm in the first wave. Likewise, the essential concept of the Senegalese (and North African) troops as >troupes d'assaut< surely embodied a doctrine. It was not the job of German propaganda to explain accurately or justify the mariner of French deployment of colonial troops, but to condemn and attack it. Thus in the hands of skilled propagandists >panachage< became »Allein ging das Gesindel nicht vor ...« The question whether, in light of all the evidence, >shock-troops< or >Kugelfang< better describes the experience of the colonial troops, must therefore be allowed to some degree to depend on one's point of view. 
IV. The African troops' contribution
Michel notes that despite France's preparations, she mobilized fewer colonial troops than Britain and these formed a lower percentage of the French army's effectives (6,6 %) than the imperial forces contributed to the British army (about 16 %) 148 . But this is hardly surprising, given on the one hand that France's manpower effort was almost entirely military, unlike Britain's, while on the other hand the British empire's population was approximately four times greater than France's. But Michel argues that the French colonial troops' psychological impact was greater, since 70 % of the North Africans and 75 % of the Senegalese served on the Western Front. Again, this point is only valid with respect to the coloured troops: the vast majority of the white British dominion troops also served on the Western Front. Overall, the French colonial troops did not comprise more than about 4 % of the total French combattants on the Western Front. Taking soldiers and labourers together, about 900 000 colonial citizens passed through France. The Histoire de la France colonial puts the colonies' contribution somewhat higher, at 7-8 %. This is still a relatively modest figure, relative to the colonies' population, particularly when one considers that those recruited in 1918 scarcely had a chance to see action, or were not even embarked (the last-mentioned applies to 20 % of the Senegalese and 25 % of the Algerians, recruited in 1918). But here it is argued their spirited conduct helped to make up for their numerical weakness 149 . The French General Staff was more guilty of Eurocentrism in ignoring the overseas resources of Britain and the United States, than with regard to France's colonies. As a result, French strategy came close to trying to defeat Germany single-handed until 1917. As Michel points out, though the Senegalese contribution to the French army's effectives appears largely symbolic (1,6 %), it nevertheless represented a heavy burden on sparsely-populated African peasant societies. It was only possible because the burden was transitory, material compensation provided and severe compulsion applied. In short, the force noire provided reassurance in France at a time of insecurity (eg, 1910-12) . But in practice it made neither a decisive contribution to victory »ni meme un appui d'envergure capitale 150 .« On the other hand, French (and British) efforts to draw extra manpower from greater France (in the way power political thinkers had dreamt of since the 1880s, to match the US and Russia) came infinitely closer to realization during the war than the rival German Mitteleuropa project (eg, the fiascoes of Belgian deported workers and a Polish army).
As to their combat effectiveness, Michel refers to the African troops' reputation for courage, but concedes their poor military cohesion and inexperience meant they broke easily under pressure and had to be withdrawn as quickly as possible after a storm assault. In addition, it was believed the Sengalese could not be used in winter; and indeed, their one attack in winter (February/March 1917, April 1917) was a disaster 151 . Balesi considers the Senegalese performance to have been »sur-prisingly good«, given their limited training and the difficult conditions. It was 148 Michel, Mythes, p. 394 (as in fn. 99). 149 Histoire de la France colonial, p. 78 (as in fn. 13). 150 During the war 160 000 Senegalese were mobilized, in addition to the 30 000 available in 1914; of these 190 000,134 000 were sent to France to fight. Michel, Colonisation, pp. 27, 35 (as in fn. 6). Porch, The Marne, pp. 381-2 (as in fn. 33). 151 Michel, Mythes, pp. 397-8 (as in fn. 99).
even excellent, under excellent leadership. But the Senegalese' opponents remained unconvinced 152 . Unlike the Senegalese, the North Africans fought well at Verdun and in the Nivelle offensive. Their combat worthiness was at its highest in 1917 and 1918, when the proportion of conscripts and French reserve officers in their formations was highest. This refutes the colonial wisdom that their combat worthiness was dependent on familiar cadres, officers and homogenous territorial units 153 . The immediate postwar German propaganda claims that the French military efforts in 1918 had depended largely on colonial troops, had nothing to do with reality, nor even with German assessments in 1918. The German General Staff relied in part on prisoner-interrogations and other sources of French military intelligence, as well as on its own troops' assessments, in forming its views. Hence German military pefceptions of the colonial troops were frequently in accordance with those of the French. At the end of 1914 both British and French head-quarters were disillusioned with the Indian and black troops. In both cases, the lightly-armed colonial troops had been thrown into the battle ill-equipped, ill-prepared and ill-trained for European warfare. The troops nevertheless sacrificed themselves gallantly and often won high recognition on the German side. On several occasions the colonial troops played a leading role in some operations (on the Somme, at Verdun and in Nivelle's 1917 offensive) and their almost exclusive employment as shock-troops lent them an importance beyond their numbers. Unlike the Indians, France's colonial troops had more opportunities to adapt themselves to conditions on the western front. While the Senegalese performance remained open to debate, the North Africans, like the British dominions' troops, were recognized on both sides to be among the best in the field.
The extent to which the French (and British) did succeed in raising troops in their colonies went beyond their own and German prewar expectations. This disregard of overseas resources was a natural consequence of the common prewar short-war orthodoxy. In addition, opposition from French settlers to colonial recruitment before the war had been noisy and obvious. The colons had feared political concessions would have to be granted in return for military service, as well as possible rises in labour costs. German analysts expected this opposition to form an obstacle to recruitment in war, and to some extent it did, until Clemenceau's accession to the premiership. But the promises of far-reaching political reforms given at this time remained unfulfilled.
Instead of the islamic colonial military revolt the German General Staff had also relied on, and the French had feared, a relative political, social, and economic revolutionizing of the colonial order came about as an unintended result of the colonial mobilization effected during the war 154 . Forcing the Entente to mobilize its colonies to an extent which involved revolutionizing the colonial order can, however, in a certain sense be counted as a success for German military pressure. In
